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There has been considerable convergence in
views about the significance of financial
development for economic growth and
resulting improvements in living standards.
This is not to discount the large and growing
debate over the channels via which financial
development impacts on growth;
understanding such linkages is essential for
the design of growth-enhancing policy.
Levine notes that
…the preponderance of theoretical
reasoning and empirical evidence
suggests a positive, first-order relation-
ship between financial development
and economic growth (1997:688).
At least one study (King and Levine 1993a)
argues for the existence of a strong link
between the level of financial development
and the subsequent rate of economic growth,
capital accumulation, and technological
change.
There is general agreement that links
between financial intermediation and
economic growth are strong (Levine, Loayza
and Beck 2000). Financial intermediaries
have a significant role in channeling funds
from savers to investors and in ameliorating
information asymmetries that are the source
of problems of adverse selection and moral
hazard pervasive in the sector. Given the
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suggestion of positive externalities from the
efficient operation of the financial sector to
the rate of growth of aggregate output, a case
may exist for public sector support to the
sector. These considerations are important
in the design of policy for the Pacific island
countries that have lagged both in terms of
economic and financial sector development.
This paper presents a simple model to
illustrate the operation of financial markets,
including the role of the various inter-
mediaries and financial instruments. An
application of this framework to the Pacific
island countries suggests that past policy
interventions to develop the sector have been
counterproductive. On the basis of this
framework, it is proposed that the public
sector withdraw from active participation in
supplying financial services (through, for
example, state-owned banks) and concentrate
on prudential regulation. A strong case also
exists for the public sector to create a
stable macroeconomic environment and
standardise reporting requirements for
investors to lower the transaction costs of
financial intermediation. These interventions
would induce financial sector development
and investment, leading to economic growth
and, by assumption, economic development.
Financial development and
economic growth
The primary purpose of the financial sector
is to mobilise savings from disparate sources
and to intermediate these savings for
investment across space and time. These
roles change as the structure of the market
evolves and the range of financial products
and services increases. Without access to
loanable funds, investors are constrained to
investment within the bounds of their
savings and often to traditional technologies
with only marginal variations. By providing
liquidity for investment, the financial sector
raises the level of output and, once this
higher level is reached, growth becomes
independent of financial activity. However,
something more than liquidity is necessary
to link financial development with the long-
term economic growth of a country.
The most influential work on the relation-
ship between financial systems and economic
development is McKinnon (1973) who uses
post World War II case study data from
several countries to argue that better
functioning financial systems support faster
economic growth. Subsequent empirical
analysis supports the proposition that
financial development precedes rapid
growth of output; such timing differences
are interpreted as implying a link (causality)
from financial development to economic
growth. The sceptics, such as Lucas (1988),
do not dispute the role of finance in growth
but question the degree of emphasis placed
on such a link.
One potential link between financial
activity and growth is through markets for
venture capital to fund innovation. Insofar
as innovation is free from the forces of
diminishing returns, the provision of
venture capital can be a source of sustained
growth. King and Levine (1993b) argue that
the financial system is a lubricant for
innovative activity, that is, the main engine
of economic growth and development. The
financial sector makes an essential contri-
bution to the rate of innovation by evaluating,
then funding, and subsequently monitoring
innovative activity. Financial repression,1
King and Levine argue, restrains the
availability of these services and thereby
impedes innovative activity and slows the
rate of economic growth.
There is other compelling evidence in
support of the finance–growth link. For
example, several cross-country growth
regressions suggest that financial services
are linked to growth (see Levine, et al. 2000).
Firm-level studies indicate that financial
liberalisation tends to increase the funding
of more efficient firms. Controlling for several
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initial conditions, financial development
complements the benefits arising from non-
financial reforms. Thus, the efficacy of other
policy reforms depends on the health of the
financial sector (King and Levine 1993b).
The skeptics have, however, kept the
debate on the direction of causality alive.
There is an obvious reverse causation in that
growth creates the demand for financial
services. When per capita income rises, the
demand for financial services rises. This
induces formation of growth-promoting
financial intermediaries, thus providing a
reason to believe that financial and economic
developments are jointly determined. Even
if there were no links between financial
development and long-run growth, the
impact of financial development on the level
of output could still be significant. Given that
the transition between steady states can last
from 60 to 70 years (see Vousden 1998), the
effect on out-of-steady-state rates of growth
can be significant.
A well-functioning financial sector fulfils
the role of providing long-term (illiquid)
capital for projects that require up-front and
lumpy investments that yield returns over the
longer term. Investors, particularly those
engaged in projects with long gestations,
demand funds that can be locked away for
considerable lengths of time and at costs that
are fixed and known at the time of the
advance. Savers, on the other hand, prefer
ready access to their funds. The presence of
well-developed financial markets allows
satisfaction of both these demands; the savers
can hold and trade equity, bonds, and
deposits in enabling ready access to savings
while the investor has access to long-term
capital and at fixed costs. Well-developed
financial systems also allow the issue of
and trade in securities, thereby trans-
forming liquid capital into an illiquid form
suitable for long-term investment; this is
one of the distinct advantages provided by
a well-functioning financial sector. When
these large investments generate sufficiently
large externalities through increasing the
productivity of resources in the rest of the
economy, financial development leads to
faster steady-state growth. For example,
investment on a major public road linking
two populous regions that leads to increased
private sector activity on the road corridor
has the potential to show growth effects for
several years.
Yet another benefit from a well-
functioning financial sector is through
provision of a means to diversify risk via its
role as a venture capitalist. Stockmarkets
provide the means to trade risk and boost
liquidity while banks ameliorate information
costs and enhance corporate governance
(Levine 1997:719). The small saver may invest
in a diversified portfolio of publicly listed
stocks and rely on the market to monitor and
induce good corporate governance by the
managers of these enterprises.
The costs of collecting and analysing
information create incentives for the
emergence of financial intermediaries. While
the individual saver may not find it cost
effective to acquire and analyse information
on all possible investment opportunities, the
financial intermediary having the advantage
of economies of scale would do so. Such
economies of scale make information
acquisition more cost effective and facilitate
efficient allocation of savings. Financial
intermediaries that have a well-diversified
investment portfolio can induce enterprises
to reveal information and thereby foster
efficient investment by lowering monitoring
costs.
A simple model of the operation
of financial markets
A depiction of factors impinging on the cost
of funds available to business is provided
in Figure 1. The C axis denotes the unit cost
of capital to business and the C(K) schedule
is the locus of points where the (free) market
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for capital clears for a given K. This schedule
can be thought of as the lower envelope
depicting the cost of funds to enterprises of
varying sizes. The K axis represents the
capital worth of businesses, and hence could
depict the market capitalisation of the
enterprise. The C(K) schedule postulates an
inverse relationship between the unit cost
of capital, C, and K; this downward sloping
function could reflect the presence of fixed
costs independent of the value of K.
rKFCT += (1)
where CT is the total cost of funds to the
borrower while r is the marginal cost of
funds to the lender. Assuming monopolistic
competition in the supply of credit, the
average cost and therefore the price of funds






In the context of financial markets, this
inverse relationship can be rationalised on
several grounds, for example, that
• benefits from economies of scale in the
provision of funds imply that the average
cost of funds will decline with the size of
the advance
• the lower risks of failure associated with
larger businesses will be reflected in the
costs of capital
• larger businesses provide greater
quantity and quality of information,
perhaps due to statutory requirements;
this lowers the cost of funds to the
enterprise
• the potential for rescue by the public
sector of very large businesses in the case
of financial failure are significant; this
lower risk to the lender will be reflected
in the cost of capital to the business
• the maturity/age of the business is
positively correlated with its size and
extent of information available to the
lender. As a consequence, costs of capital
will be lower to a large, mature business
than to its new, smaller counterparts.
It is also postulated that businesses move
along the C(K) schedule as the natural
processes of birth, growth, mergers and
fragmentation of enterprises take place over
time.
The wholesale price of funds for a given
maturity is shown by the horizontal schedule
denoted by r on the vertical axis. This price
may be construed as the (pure) rate of time
preference of consumers. Financial inter-
mediaries may acquire funds at the cost of r
and lend it at a cost determined by the C(K)
schedule. Here, r may be interpreted as the
bond rate or the price of long-term securities.
In reality, the financial market is made
up of a broad spectrum of lenders and
borrowers ranging in the case of the Pacific
island countries from the small betelnut
vendors who rely on their own savings and
those of their immediate kin to the very large
public companies that raise funds through
the issue of long-term securities and equity
capital. Among the financial intermediaries,
banks serve only a distinct section of this
market, as shown by the region enclosed by
BL and BH. Fixed transaction costs, such as
Figure 1 The operation of financial markets
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those associated with acquiring information
on the credit worthiness of a borrower, make
loans smaller than BL unprofitable; this
market to the left of BL is served by the more
competitive suppliers of finance such as the
local money lenders, relatives, and self-
finance. The wiggly line that separates these
two groups of suppliers of finance indicates
that the demarcation between them may not
be distinct since there is considerable room
for the integration of the banks with
moneylenders and agencies associated with
micro-finance.
Profit-maximising banks withdraw from
lending beyond BH because the margins are
not sufficient to cover their costs of lending,
inclusive of industry specific costs such as
license fees. At J, the business is large
enough to jump/transit the use of bank-
finance and to be able to raise capital via the
issue of securities and/or through raising
share capital. Since the market-clearing price
of finance to business in the interval between
BH and SH is greater than r, the securities
market may only operate up to SH; beyond
this point finance may be raised through the
issue of equity capital alone. The figure
shows that to the right of SH, C(K) is less
than r; this reflects the possibility that in this
range dividend yields could be lower than
the yield on long-term securities. Savers are
willing to lend their funds in this range in
anticipation of future capital gains; however,
this ‘anticipation effect’ is not captured in
the above framework.2 Hence, the stock and
securities markets operate in the range to the
right of BH; banks may integrate with this
market as depicted by the porous wall.
The simple framework provided in
Figure 1 can be used to illustrate several
other issues in relation to the operation of
financial markets.
• The horizontal axis could depict the
plethora of financial instruments used
in providing capital to business. For
values of K close to the origin, self-finance
would be the prime source; a mixture of
debt and equity would be the instrument
in the intermediate ranges; and, perhaps
long-term securities provide funds for
the largest of the investments. There will
be further subdivisions within each of
those aggregates.
• As firms mature and grow, they move
down the C(K) schedule; perhaps not
smoothly but with some falling to the
wayside through attrition. One of the
assumptions underlying the inverse
relationship between the cost of funds
and the size of loans has been that the
probability of financial collapse falls as
firms grow larger and mature over time.
Another related assumption is that the
association between the lender and the
borrower improves with the length of
relationship by allowing for the develop-
ment of a credit history such that the cost
of funds falls over time, even for a given
level of K. Hence, a third axis depicting
time could produce a plane showing that
the cost of capital to business falls with
both the size of the advance and with
the passage of time.
• Policy interventions such as the
imposition of an interest rate ceiling affect
the size of the market served by each of
the suppliers. For example, a ceiling of rZ
will shrink the market for banks to the
area between BZ and BH. The void left as a
result would be filled by less efficient
lenders, including those from the informal
sector. This induced inefficient entry
raises the cost of capital to borrowers and
constrains financial sector development.
• The cost of funds is affected by the
monetary and fiscal policies. For example,
an inflationary environment will lead to
a higher value of r, even with an open
capital account, due to exchange rate
risks. Sovereign risks such as those
associated with risks of nationalisation
of industry will also raise the cost of
funds.
• The C(K) schedule sinks towards the
origin as creditors’ rights are enforced
by the local courts and bankruptcy laws
are simplified. The availability of better
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information in the form of standardised
accounting and reporting requirements
also assists in reducing lending margins.
This in turn leads to a lowering of costs
of funds.
Key characteristics of financial
sectors in Pacific island countries
Before considering the extent to which the
above framework can be applied to better
understand financial markets within the
Pacific island countries, we survey the
current financial depth and structure of these
markets in a few of the countries. A more
comprehensive survey is beyond the purview
of this paper. However, it should be noted
that the specific cases highlighted here are
not isolated incidences but seem to be
pervasive across the whole region, albeit
with different degrees of seriousness.
One common means of gauging financial
depth in an economy is to look at the ratio of
liquid liabilities (comprising currency in
circulation and demand deposits) to GDP.
Data from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) has been used to compute this
figure for Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and
Vanuatu. The choice of the countries was
driven by the availability of consistent data;
the IFS does not provide any data for several
Pacific island countries. Measures of financial
depth, as with any other empirical measure,
have their problems with reliability of the
source data. For example, liquid capital may
constitute holdings of stocks in addition to
cash and demand deposits; the measure of
financial depth in this case suffers from the
omission of a relevant variable for which
there is no consistent data. Furthermore, the
presence of substitutes for cash in the form
of pigs, tabua, mats, and so on, that are often
used as a medium for exchange compounds
the problem of omission of relevant variables.
Not withstanding these problems, the
financial depth of the listed countries are
computed and compared to the estimates of
King and Levine (1993a).
Financial depth is lacking in Fiji, Papua
New Guinea and Vanuatu (Table 1), and
there is little reason to believe the same is
not true for the rest of the Pacific island
countries. Financial depth is particularly
low, even in comparison to the figures for
the averages for poor and middle income
Table 1 Indicators of financial depth in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu and comparator
countries, 1987
Country Per capita GDP (US$ 1987) Financial depth
Fiji 1,570 0.17
Papua New Guinea 700 0.27
Vanuatu .. 0.24
Comparatorsa
Very poor countries <391 0.26
Poor countries >391 and <1,161 0.39
Rich countries >1,161 and <4,998 0.51
Very rich countries >4,998 0.67
a The figures used for comparison are drawn from King and Levine (1993a).
Notes: Financial depth is defined as (CC+DD)/GDP; CC denotes currency in circulation; DD denotes
demand deposits; and GDP is gross domestic product; all values are in 1997 local currency units. The per-
capita GDP figures are in 1987 US$ to provide comparisons with the figures in the lower half of the table.
Sources: Data extracted from World Bank tables and International Financial Statistics (IMF. 1948–).
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countries with similar per capita income to
the Pacific island countries. For example,
Fiji, a middle-income country, has financial
depth of 17 per cent, comparable to the very
poor countries as reported in King and
Levine (1993a). Not withstanding the
problems with the quality of data, there is
other supporting circumstantial evidence of
the poor state of financial sector activity in
many of the Pacific island countries. For
example, the 85 per cent of the population of
Papua New Guineans who live in rural
areas have access to basic and intermittent
banking services. In the urban areas, queues
at banking outlets extend to hundreds on
paydays. The PNG banking sector, as of
1997, accounted for 28.1 per cent of the
domestic credit provided; this compares
with 88 per cent for Australia, 49.3 per cent
for India, and 54.3 per cent for Indonesia
(World Bank 1999). These observations are
symptomatic of communities being deprived
of competitively priced banking services.
It is often acknowledged that the non-
monetary sector makes up a significant
proportion of economic activity in the Pacific
island countries. Much of these activities
take place in the absence of financial
intermediation and through well-established
community norms. For example, it is a
common practice in the rural villages of Fiji
to share a good catch of fish and an excellent
harvest from the gardens. These exchanges
are undertaken to smooth consumption
over time through creation of obligations;
they are symptomatic of economies lacking
competitive instruments for saving. If
increasing financial depth has a positive
externality on the rate of growth of output
in an economy, then it could be worthwhile
exploring strategies to induce entry of the
subsistence sectors into the monetary sector.
Furthermore, the above would imply that
financial depth is greater in the monetary
sector than in the subsistence sectors of the
economy. This is supported by casual
observation of the extent of use of cash in
urban vis-à-vis rural areas of the Pacific
island countries; the international financial
centres perhaps provide the starkest of
contrasts.
Another area of minimal activity in the
Pacific island countries is their stockmarkets.
There is some stockmarket activity in Port
Moresby and Suva; these markets are thin
both in terms of the number of stocks listed
and extent of daily trading. For example, as
of January 2001, a total of nine companies
were listed on Suva’s South Pacific Stock
Exchange; their total market capitalisation
was around F$235 million or 7 per cent of
GDP. The total value of trade that took place
on 4 December 2000—the last day of trading
for the calendar year—was F$15,518 or less
than 0.01 per cent of the value of the stock.
Most of the companies listed on the stock
exchange are either local subsidiaries of
multinationals or divested state enterprises.
Several of the local companies, particularly
those in Fiji, that have grown into multi-
million dollar businesses have tended to
remain family-run enterprises. This is in
sharp contrast to recent technology
companies in the United States that rushed
to be listed. The reluctance of businesses in
the Pacific island countries to make the
transition at point ‘J’ in Figure 1 deserves
some scrutiny to better understand the
impediments to a more vibrant stockmarket
in the region.
The smallness of the individual markets
in the Pacific island countries makes the
operation of stock exchanges in each of the
capital cities uneconomic. Technology in the
form of Internet trading has overcome
problems of isolation. Options to better
integrate the stockmarkets in the region via
the Internet and perhaps digital TV could
be explored in order to deepen this market.
Costs of funds in Papua New Guinea,
particularly to small rural entrepreneurs,
range from 10–600 per cent; these figures
compare unfavourably with neighbours
Australia and Fiji. Such high costs of funds
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imply that only projects with appropriately
high returns get the go-ahead. Furthermore,
insecurity of property rights on potential
collateral often requires entrepreneurs to
have significant equity in the project before
the lender funds it. The absence of creditor
records constrains the credit provider in
allowing for credit risk in costing the loan.
These costs reduce the extent of investment,
and hence penalise employment and output
growth in the rural districts.
Villagers in Papua New Guinea often
have to travel long distances for banking
facilities—should they have a bank account
to begin with. The local trade stores charge
up to 10 per cent of the value of a cheque to
cash it and only after establishing the
identity of the client and credit worthiness
of the issuer of the cheque. To cash a
competitors’ cheque, the Papua New
Guinea Banking Corporation (PNGBC)
charges 5 per cent of its value for the service
and only when proof of identity of the client
is provided and the cheque is written out
by the government or a creditworthy large
corporation. These high costs are attributable
to a combination of the market power the
few providers have, the small scale of
operation, the high cost of information on
customers, and high costs of intermediate
inputs such as the transportation of cash,
telecommunications, and so on. These costs
act as a tax on financial intermediation,
thereby lowering both savings and investment
in the economy. The reduced liquidity
constrains access to health, medicines,
education, and so on, to these communities.
Although the bulk of the financial services
in the Pacific island countries is provided
by banks; other financial institutions
including credit unions, national provident
funds, and small rural thrift and credit
unions, are engaged in the sector. The
informal sector, including relatives, the local
trade-store that provides goods on credit,
and local moneylenders provide the link
between the small client and the formal
institutions. In thinking about deepening the
financial sector, it is important to consider
the potential role these institutions could
play in financial and economic development
as there are obvious benefits from engaging
the wider community in the economic
welfare of the nation. This thought now
leads to considerations of public sector
intervention in fostering financial develop-
ment in the Pacific island countries.
Past public sector interventions in
the financial sector
In several Pacific island countries, the
active participation of the state in the
provision of financial services has been
counter-productive. State-owned financial
institutions that have delivered highly
subsidised services have ‘crowded-out’ the
private sector. Price regulation in the form
of an interest rate ceiling has compounded
this problem. Many of these state-owned
enterprises are not financially viable and
their reliance on public sector support has
had serious budgetary consequences. These
interventions—intended to provide cheap
financial services to the community—end
up constraining the development of the
financial sector. The subsidised credit leads
to demand in excess of supply, and to credit
rationing by the lender and demands for
increased public sector support to such
schemes. Rationing creates incentives for
rent seeking, including crony-capitalism,
corruption and nepotism.
One implication from the above is for the
state to refrain from participation in the
provision of financial services and allow the
competitive forces of the market to determine
level of supply and prices for the services. In
specific cases where private sector activity
is absent, the state may ‘purchase’ the
required services through competitive bids
from private providers. Otherwise, the role
of the state should remain that of a regulator.
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Many of the Pacific island countries
have financial institutions for provision of
development finance (for example, the Fiji
Development Bank (FDB) and the National
Bank of Fiji (NBF) in Fiji, PNGBC and the
Investment Corporation of Papua New
Guinea in Papua New Guinea). These
institutions have attempted to provide
subsidised credit to enterprises in sectors
designated to be of priority by their govern-
ments. The subsidies are funded either from
the budget or from other profitable areas of
the business. In terms of Figure 1, finance is
provided at the price r Z or less to borrowers
that fall in the region to the left of B Z. Such
intervention impacts on both the supply and
demand of finance services. On the supply
side, the intervention squeezes the client
base of the other financial intermediaries,
thereby raising costs to the remainder of the
borrowers. On the demand side, the problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard lead
to the funds being used less than efficiently.
The price of funds being less than the
market-clearing level leads to excess demand;
the ensuing credit rationing is the source of
corruption and crony capitalism.
Often, a concentration of loans to a few
preferred borrowers compounds the problem
for the lender. For example, recent work on
PNGBC shows that some 60 per cent of the
total loans by value are held by less than 1
per cent of the total population of borrowers.
These large loans have had a long history of
poor performance, culminating in severe
problems for PNGBC’s liquidity and even its
solvency. This is not an isolated incident;
similar examples are littered across the
Pacific island countries. In terms of Figure 1,
the above practice is akin to transplanting
borrowers who would normally reside to the
left of BL to a region to the right of this
threshold and with an interest rate ceiling.
The poor record of success of such
transplants suggests that these interventions
are ill-advised.
Superannuation schemes are popular in
the Pacific island countries as a means of
funding the retirement of workers. These
schemes create illiquid funds that are
suitable for long-term investments. When the
number of people entering the scheme is
larger than those exiting—as is the case in
nearly all of the Pacific island countries—the
superannuation schemes produce a growing
stock of illiquid capital. Governments have
found these funds an attractive source of
finance for their budget deficits. Once again,
many of these schemes have failed to deliver
on the hopes that these schemes created on
their inception. For example, the Public
Officers’ Superannuation Fund (POSF) in
Papua New Guinea has lost considerable
amounts of money in failed real estate
investments in Australia. Now, there is a
distinct possibility that members will lose a
large part of their contributions to POSF.
Such incidences erode confidence in the
saving schemes and are to the detriment of
savings and financial sector activity. This
could be an extreme case, but problems of a
similar nature—perhaps of a lesser degree—
seem to be pervasive.
Governments have attempted to catapult
specific sections of the population into
entrepreneurial activity through specialised
entities created for the purpose. For example,
several attempts have been made by
provincial authorities in Fiji to enable the
indigenous population to take a more active
part in commerce through purchase of
shares in local companies. Many of these
investments were funded with public money
and contributions from the villagers. Several
of these investments failed to produce a
return. Some of the companies that were
initially considered to be good financial
prospects went bankrupt after the investment
was made, and in the few cases where
profits were realised, a disproportionate
amount was siphoned off by the inter-
mediaries. In the process, corruption and
nepotism together with demands for further
public support to make these ventures viable
has prevailed (see Ratuva 2000).
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Governments have become directly
involved in business, supposedly because
the private sector did not have the financial
capacity to fill the void. Several airlines, the
Forum Shipping Company, and national
banks were initiated on this pretext. The
promise made at the start was that these
companies would contribute to economic
activity and to the state budget. The state-
owned enterprises in Papua New Guinea
were once mandated by their government to
provide a specified rate of return on the
investment;3 not surprisingly, these returns
did not eventuate.
Options for enhancing financial
sector development
A revision of Figure 1 draws on the options
available to policymakers in developing the
financial sectors in their countries. Policy can
act on the two schedules, r and C(K), in
increasing financial depth (Figure 2). The
options can be interpreted as attempts to shift
borrowers and lenders along the horizontal
axis as shown by the arrow labelled 0 and
with an interest rate ceiling at r Z; here we
consider moving the two schedules along the
vertical axis. Policy options available to
reduce the general interest rate facing the
economy are denoted by I while those
associated with lowering the margin between
r and C(K) are labelled II.
The general rate of interest an economy
faces is dependent on the macroeconomic
conditions such as the rate and variability
of inflation and exchange rates, and the level
of budget deficits and public sector debt.
Price stability in terms of low rates of inflation
and a stable exchange rate translates into a
low rate of interest. A good credit rating for
the public sector translates into low rates of
interest for the whole economy. Policymakers
can minimise r by ensuring that their
budgets balance over time and debt is kept
at sustainable levels. Assuring monetary
independence for the central bank and
disallowing the monetisation of budget
deficits may help. The Central Bank Act
passed by the PNG Parliament in March
2000 serves as a useful guide in this regard.4
Ensuring macroeconomic stability, including
that of the exchange rate, would be one
means of achieving the shift depicted by the
arrow labelled as I in Figure 2.
The margin that financial intermediaries
charge for the provision of financial services
may be reduced via a reduction in the
intermediate costs of the sector. The most
obvious of these costs are those associated
with the ability to enforce (debt) contracts.
Security to property rights, including access
to collateral, directly impinges on the margin
as depicted by the arrow labelled as II in
Figure 2. Small borrowers with little or no
security pay punitive rates of interest on their
advances (which is generally of a short-term
nature) because of the high transaction costs
associated with such lending. The CEO of a
multinational bank based in Port Moresby
advised the author that lending to coffee
plantations in the country was high risk
because ‘it is impossible to take possession
Figure 2 Policy options for increasing
financial depth
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of the major collateral, land, should the
venture fail’. Wealth locked into land, the one
major asset that many residents have, often
cannot be accessed to secure credit due to the
opaque definition of individual property
rights on communal land and problems of
enforcement of such property rights. As a
result, a wide section of the community is
deprived of access to competitively priced
finance.5
Other intermediate inputs into finance
include costs of transportation of funds,
including telecommunications and those
associated with security. Unreliable tele-
communications and high security costs are
blamed for the lack of banking services in
much of Papua New Guinea. Maintenance
of law and order and provision of basic
transport and social infrastructure have
beneficial externalities on all sectors of the
economy and as such should be a primary
responsibility of governments. These basic
services are inputs into most activities, and
hence public sector funding of these services
would not disadvantage any sector within
the economy. The high costs of these inter-
mediate inputs constrain the expansion of the
financial sector in Papua New Guinea, and
perhaps in several other Pacific island
countries. Regulatory barriers compound this
problem and impede competition in the sector,
giving market power to the few suppliers.
Regulation and supervision
Given the positive externalities on aggregate
output and national welfare from well-
functioning financial sectors, and the
negative externalities from financial sector
collapses, there is a substantial and
significant role for sensible regulation of the
financial sector.
Financial intermediaries mobilise
savings from a large population of small
savers; many of these savers do not have the
capacity to monitor the use of their funds. A
collapse of any of the deposit-taking
institutions has the potential to lead to bank-
runs with cascading effects on the liquidity
of other related and otherwise solvent
institutions. A lender of last resort needs very
deep pockets for a successful rescue when
such a crisis takes effect. The financial crisis
leads to an erosion in aggregate savings, and
hence in total investment, and subsequently
in the rate of growth of aggregate output. In
this context finance is akin to oil in an
internal combustion engine, while the
intermediaries perform the role of the oil
pump; the breakdown of the pump and/or
leakage of oil cause damage to and potential
seizure of the engine.6 For these reasons,
governments cannot afford to stand aside
and allow the collapse of large financial
institutions. Often, the central bank is obliged
to act as the lender of last resort to financial
institutions experiencing liquidity problems.
Insolvent institutions require winding
down, often with public sector support, to
prevent the creation of panic.
The inability of depositors to monitor
their banks’ behaviour necessitates prudent-
ial regulation. Governments have invariably
come to the rescue of depositors in the case
of bank insolvencies. As a result, however,
the financial institutions have an incentive
to take excessive risk given the implicit
insurance provided by the state. One option
available to policymakers is to price this
service, or better still to induce the private
sector to provide such insurance. These ex
ante arrangements are time-inconsistent
since, ex post the crisis, the state has little
option but to come to the rescue. Regulation,
therefore, is still necessary to prevent
excessive risk-taking by financial institutions.
In the Pacific island countries, the bulk
of risks of financial crisis have emanated
from state-run banks since their private
counterparts, being subsidiaries of foreign
banks, have their parents for support. For
example, if the Fiji subsidiary of Westpac
collapses, the responsibility for its rescue
rests with the parent company in Australia
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and the Reserve Bank of Australia; the latter
because the parent company is registered in
Australia. In contrast, liquidity and solvency
problems of the National Bank of Fiji are the
problems of the Fiji authorities. 7
The limited liability of companies
compounds the problems of moral hazard.
Limited liability financial intermediaries
have an incentive to engage in lending that
is riskier than the expected value of financial
gains, given that the lender would realise the
full benefit of successful investments but bear
only a fraction of the penalty of failed
investments. This would suggest that
regulation is necessary to induce responsible
investment by the intermediaries.
The stock and securities markets also
rely on many and disparate investors; these
investors rely on publicly available inform-
ation for their investments. Once again, these
markets are ‘vulnerable to the frictions and
instabilities that fraud, misrepresentation, or
even just non-uniformity of presentation can
create’ (White 1999:6). The self-fulfilling
nature of bank8 and stockmarket runs on the
collapse of public confidence in these
institutions strongly suggests that prevention
is a far superior strategy to ex-post remedies;
hence there is a crucial role for regulation
in these markets.
Policymakers have several options for
improving the prudential (safety and
soundness or risk-restraining) regulation of
their financial sectors. These actions are
targeted at either inducing self-regulation
through making actions of intermediaries
public information and/or through the
withdrawal of the commitment to rescue
failing financial institutions at the expense
of the taxpayer. The latter commitment is
generally not credible; hence policymakers
try to price the value of their service to private
providers of financial services.
Instruments commonly used in prudential
regulation of the financial sector in the
Pacific island countries include, but are not
limited to the following: stipulated minimum
capital net worth requirements to provide a
buffer against potential insolvency; minimum
liquid asset holdings at the central bank—
put in place to ensure availability of a
minimal level of liquidity; limitations on the
range of activities—put in place to prevent
unnecessary risk taking; and disclosure
rules that require the intermediaries to reveal
information on their operations to a
monitoring agency, often a section within
the central bank—to induce responsible
lending. To date, these measures have
worked to produce the desired effects, except
for state-owned enterprises; examples of the
latter include the recent problems of the
PNGBC and the NBF. One fruitful area of
research in design of better regulatory
policies for the financial sector in the Pacific
island countries would be to investigate
reasons for these departures from the norms.
Making information more transparent
by implementing accounting standards and
disclosure rules that mandate provision of
financial information to the shareholders,
creditors, and the stockmarket, will induce
more responsible behaviour on the part of
financial intermediaries. The threat of a fall
in stock prices due to adverse information
about the business will induce managers to
act in the best interests of the owners, even
when such ownership is diverse and thinly
distributed.
Many of the Pacific island countries are
too small for meaningful competition in their
financial sector. For example, Nauru with a
population of 12,000 people, cannot be
expected to have more than one bank branch.
If competition is to be relied on for the delivery
of competitively-priced services in the
absence of price regulation, then markets
have to remain contestable. Minimising
regulatory barriers to entry and exit is one
means of inducing competitive pricing of
financial services. Direct monitoring of anti-
competitive behaviour may induce
competitive pricing by the incumbents.
Allowing domestic markets to integrate with
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global financial markets, particularly given
the advances in communications technology,
could lead to increased competition in the
domestic financial sector. Allowing domestic
firms to list and issue shares on foreign stock
exchanges, encouraging banks to offer trading
on the stock exchange, and allowing trade in
index funds could all deepen the financial
markets of the Pacific island countries.
Not withstanding the above, some of
the isolated small communities of the Pacific
island countries may still be deprived of
financial services. In these cases, the
purchase of financial services by the state
on a competitive basis from private providers
may be necessary. These purchases should
be transparent in terms of the costs involved,
while competitive provision would ensure
that the most efficient mode of supply is
chosen, hence maximising efficiency of
resource use in the provision of the service.
As countries develop, their financial
structure evolves (Levine 1997). Changes that
take place with growth in per capita income
include an increase in the size of the financial
sector, as measured by the size of total assets
or liabilities of the financial intermediaries
relative to GDP; a shift in the allocation of
credit, particularly to the private sector, from
the central bank to the commercial banks;
growth in non-bank intermediaries such as
insurance companies, investment banks, and
pension funds; and an increase in stock-
market activity, as quantified by the turnover
and value ratio. Evidence over the last two
decades in support of such development in
the Pacific island countries is lacking. In the
case of Fiji, financial depth, defined as the
ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, has increased
only marginally over the last two decades
(Figure 3). Financial depth increased from
approximately 10 per cent of GDP in 1980 to
17 per cent in 1998; this change translates to
an annual rate of growth in financial depth
of 3 per cent. New Zealand, which seems to
have started from a similar position to Fiji,
had an annual growth rate in its financial
depth of 6.8 per cent and reached a proportion
of liquid liabilities to GDP of 34 per cent by
1997. Data on the allocation of credit to the
private sector by commercial banks is not
available, but credit growth has remained
subdued for much of the last decade—
perhaps as the result of political uncertainty.
Figure 3 Fiji: financial depth over time, 1980–2000
Notes: Financial depth is defined as the ratio of liquid liabilities (comprising currency in circulation and
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Most of the Pacific island countries have
a regulatory framework adequate to ensure
safe operation of their financial sectors. These
regulations require enforcement; an area that
needs a lot more resources. Two recent cases
may illustrate this point. The financial
problems faced by the National Bank of Fiji
would not have arisen, at least to the same
extent, had the legislated capital adequacy
requirements been enforced. The
responsibility for enforcement of these
regulations rests with Reserve Bank of Fiji and
the state.9 Similarly, the PNG–POSF debacle
on the failed real estate investment in
Australia would not have arisen had all the
legislated procedures been followed prior to
the commitment of members’ funds.10
The Pacific island countries are
geographically isolated from the major
finance markets, but recent progress in
information technology is overcoming this
handicap. There is every possibility for
seamless integration of global capital
markets via the Internet. A standardised
and transparent regulatory framework, that
treats foreign and domestic investment
neutrally, protects creditor and stockholder
rights, and has a bankruptcy code that is
consistent with those operating in the larger
markets will reduce cost of capital to
entrepreneurs and encourage greater
financial activity in the region. This will
provide opportunities for diversification of
investment in and from the region.
Conclusion
Could it be that insufficient financial
development in the Pacific island countries
has been a serious obstacle to growth in these
countries? Some of the Pacific island
countries appear to have had stable macro-
economic conditions, an educated workforce,
and an open trading regime; and yet their
development record over the last two decades
has been far from exemplary. For example,
in Samoa, the macroeconomic conditions in
terms of a stable exchange rate, low rates of
inflation and interest rates, an educated
population and an open trade regime, have
been inadequate to sustain growth over the
long term.
Evidence suggests that countries with
financial institutions that are effective at
revealing information with greater clarity
will promote faster economic growth through
increased investment than their counterparts
that are less adept at doing the same. Relative
to their income level, most of the Pacific
island countries have lagged behind other
developing countries in terms of develop-
ment of their financial sectors. Even in the
case of international financial centres such
as those in Port Vila and Raratonga, the rural
population has limited access to financial
services. As much as growth in income leads
to a rise in demand and hence supply of
financial services, there is significant
empirical evidence to suggest that economic
growth follows financial development. There
are several ingredients to growth; the
experiences of the past in other countries
suggest that the absence of any one ingredient
can become a serious impediment to the
growth process.
Policymakers have a significant role in
the development of their financial sectors.
Monetary and fiscal policies affect taxation
of financial intermediaries; legal systems
affect operation of financial systems; and
national institutions influence the develop-
ment of financial institutions. Past attempts
at controlling interest rates and active public
sector participation in the delivery of
financial services have been detrimental to
the development of efficient financial sectors
in the region. Policy has a role in prudential
regulation of the financial sector and in the
creation of a macroeconomic environment
that is conducive to investment. Enabling
better access to information via standardising
disclosure and reporting requirements
across the region will reduce the cost of
lending, thereby encouraging financial
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sector activity. All of these factors are within
the remit of policymakers.
Many of the Pacific island countries
have the regulatory structure necessary for
prudential regulation of their financial
sectors but lag in their capacity to translate
these regulations into action. To be able to
deliver on their intent, regulations have to be
enforced; for this to happen, the regulatory
agencies need an adequate number of well-
trained and well-paid staff. Evidence of the
availability of such capacity in the Pacific
island countries is lacking. Moreover, the
state-owned enterprises have not been
subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as
their counterparts in the private sector.
Capacity building in these areas should be
a priority. The small size of some of the
Pacific island countries may require
amalgamation of regulatory agencies
across the region to provide the benefits
from economies of scale. Alternatively, some
of the regulatory services could be out-
sourced to agencies better equipped for the
task. These options are worthy of further
consideration.
Notes
1 That is, placing limits on interest rates or
credit availability more generally.
2 We can build these factors in, together with
notions of uncertainty, but doing so is at the
cost of losing simplicity; at this stage we
believe this is not worth the effort.
3 See for example, clause 5 of the PNG
National Executive Council decision number
163/83 that was passed on 5 October, 1983.
4 The Act provides for the usual caveats on
political interference with the conduct of
monetary policy; the caveat is that it limits
the Government of Papua New Guinea to a
K100 million overdraft from the Bank of
Papua New Guinea.
5 De Soto (2000) argues that the inability to use
assets, particularly land without clear title, to
leverage off into capitalism is the basic reason
for poverty in the developing world.
6 Finance is often referred to as the ‘lubricant’
of the modern economy.
7 Under the National Bank of Fiji Act, the
Government of Fiji fully guarantees the
deposits with NBF and therefore could be
obliged to rescue an insolvent NBF.
8 Even solvent banks are prone to becoming
illiquid after a significant run on their
deposits.
9 See Siwatibau (1996) for a commentary on
the rescue by the state of NBF.
1 0 Submissions made to the National Provident
Fund Commission of Inquiry suggest
considerable procedural anomalies in the
disbursement of funds.
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